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A CODIFIED LAW OF TORT-THE FRENCH
EXPERIENCE*
Andr6 Tunc**
The purpose of this lecture is not to demonstrate any supe-
riority of a codified law system over a system of judge-made
law. The speaker does not wish to hide the fact that he strongly
believes in the values of codification,' but to establish such
values is not his present purpose. And, if he were to prepare a
case for codiication, he would certainly not choose to build it
on civil liability, a field of law where decision may depend on
subtle variations of facts and which is presently so unstable
that one may consider that it is in a state of crisis.'
Nor is the aim of this lecture merely to present a summary
of the French law of civil liability, as valuable pictures of this
matter have already been drawn.' Between a demonstration
and a mere photography, however, there may still be room for
a critical examination. The ambition of the speaker is to evalu-
ate the French law of civil liability and to show, on the basis
of experience, its values and its weaknesses. The speaker does
not consider that his assessment authorizes any decisive con-
* This was the seventh of the Tucker Lecture Series, delivered at the Louisiana
State University Law Center on March 9, 1978.
** Professor of Law, University of Paris (Panthdon-Sorbonne).
1. Indeed, the author's belief is as strong as that of Colonel John Tucker, Jr., to
whom this lecture is dedicated.
See, e.g., Tunc, Codification: The French Experience, in PROBLEMS OF
CODIFICATION 63 (S. Stoljar ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Codification]; Tunc, The
Grand Outlines of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 19
(B. Schwartz ed. 1956); Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REv.
459 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Methodology]. See also Tucker, Au-d~la du Code civil,
mais par le Code civil, 34 LA. L. REV. 957 (1974).
2. See generally Tunc, Introduction- Torts §§ 1-2, 179-81, in 11 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 1 (1974).
3. See M. AMOS & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (3d ed. 1963); F.
LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIL LAW (1950); A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM 555-690 (2d ed. 1977); K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, THE INSTITUTIONS OF
PRIVATE LAW 283-88, 300-22, 347-51, in 2 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (T.
Weir trans. 1977).
See also R. DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS (1976); Catala &
Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel (pt. 1), 37 TUL. L. REv. 573 (1963); (pts.
2-3), 38 TUL. L. REV. 221, 664 (1964);'(pt. 4), 39 TUL. L. REV. 701 (1965).
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clusion as to the merits of codification in general, even in the
field of civil liability. He would even be the first to underline
that no conclusion should be drawn without considering the
experiences of other codified law systems, those of Louisiana,
Quebec, Germany, and Switzerland, to name only a few. Even
Louisiana and Belgium, on the basis of provisions which are
very simlar to the French ones, have a somewhat different
experience.' In fact, the similarity between the provisions of the
Civil Code in this field in Louisiana and in France is such that
the French provisions shall be, at the outset of this lecture,
briefly presented in comparison with their counterparts in the
Louisiana Civil Code.
As it is well known, articles 1382 and 1383 of the French
Civil Code are practically identical to the first sentence of
articles 2315 and 2316, respectively, of the Louisiana Civil
Code: "Every act'whatever of man that causes damage to an-
other, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it,"'
and "Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions
not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence,
or his want of skill."6 The French provision does not mention
the want of skill.
Article 1384 of the French Civil Code embodies rules com-
parable to the ones which may be found in articles 2317
through 2320 of the Louisiana Civil' Code. It is followed by
articles 1385 and 1386 dealing respectively, as do articles 2321
and 2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code, with liability for animals
and liability for falling buildings. The rules are different as
regards the former, identical as regards the latter.
Most remarkable among such provisions is. the first para-
graph of article 1384, identical with the first sentence of article
2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code: "We are responsible, not only
for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which
is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or
4. See generally J. BAUDOUIN, LA RESPONSABILrIT CIVILE D9LICTUELLE, in 4 TRArrt
ILEMENTAIRt DE DROIT CIVIL (1973) (Quebec law); 1 R. DALcQ, TRAITt DE LA RESPONSA-
BILrr9 CivILE (2d ed. 1967) (Belgium law); F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE, in 12 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1977) (Louisiana law).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
6. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2316.
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of the things which we have in our custody." This provision is
probably, out of all the articles in the Code, the one which is
now the most used by plaintiffs. However, it is clear that it was
originally supposed to have no meaning at all. It was a mere
Nlhgance de style, a transition between rules on liability for
one's own acts and rules on vicarious liabilities and liabilities
for one's animal or falling buildings. Although it was techni-
cally a mistake to insert such a sentence in a code, in this case,
the sentence was destined to have a bright future.
Before evaluating the provisions of the French Civil Code
on civil liability, their brevity must be emphasized. The draf-
ters of the Code felt it possible to deal with the matter in five
articles. In contrast, at the turn of the century, the matter was
governed by thirty-one articles in the German Civil Code. The
Civil Code of Ethiopia, enacted in 1962 on the proposals of
Professor Rene David, dealt with the matter in one hundred
and thirty-three articles. The United States Restatement of the
Law on Torts contained five hundred and three sections in its
first edition and a few more in its second.
The drafters of the French Civil Code, however, notwith-
standing their lack of experience in codification, remarkably
had foreseen that the Code would be the mere foundation of the
law, not the whole law, and that the courts would have to
develop the meaning and the scope of its provisions. Still, it
was on a singularly narrow basis that the French law of civil
liability was built.
THE VALUES OF THE FRENCH CODIFICATION
It is certainly not fashionable at the present time to pro-
nounce oneself in favor of the fault principle. However, the
speaker must confess his admiration for the drafters of the
French Civil Code having made this principle the cornerstone
of civil liability.
To avoid any misunderstanding, the concept of fault must
immediately be clarified.7 In the Roman law tradition, to which
the drafters of the French Code intended to remain faithful,
7. See F. STONE, supra note 4, at §§ 59-61; Catala & Weir, Delict and Torts: A
Study in Parallel (pt. 1), 37 TUL. L. REV. 573, 606 (1963).
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fault is a departure from the behavior which is expected of a
bonus pater familias, the good father of a family, "the prudent
administrator" to which article 1908 of the Louisiana Civil
Code refers. The definition is valid in the field of civil liability
as well as in contractual obligations, but it has an obviously
outmoded perspective. For instance, a caustic writer has re-
marked that it imposes upon a music-hall girl or even a strip-
tease girl the duty to perform her act "as a good father of a
family would do," which is a strange standard to apply to her.
A more modern formulation could be found. Reference could
instead be made to the behavior of a reasonable citizen, a per-
son careful, diligent, mindful of his duties towards himself and
others. The basic idea, however, remains the same; even
though the speaker shares the modern view that large fields of
civil liability should be governed by principles which have little
connection with the fault principle,8 he believes that the fault
principle was rightly chosen as the basis of our law at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. In its proper field, it re-
mains of great value.
Let us consider briefly the matter in its historical perspec-
tive.' Whether we observe the laws of Israel, the laws of Rome,
the Germanic customs, the ancient laws of China or Japan, or
the customs of Africa or of "primitive" tribes in Papua or in
the Amazon Basin, we find a catalogue of forbidden acts. Such
acts entail a liability which may be collective or individual,
and which "is concurrently criminal and civil, the accent being
on one side or the other depending on the act. Canon law was
probably the major contributor to the development of the role
of intent in the law and, more broadly, to an adjustment of the
law to the morality of the wrongdoer. This fact may be attribut-
able to the confusion of crime and sin. It was nevertheless
fortunate in its result, as it opened the way to the recognition
of fault as a decisive factor in the field of civil liability.
The development occurred in two ways. First, criminal
liability ceased to be measured by the extent of the damage
8. See Tunc, supra note 2, at §§ 113-53. Compare G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 115-22 (1976) with Tunc, supra note 2, at §§ 154-78.
9. See Tunc, supra note 2, at §§ 55-70.
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inflicted and began to relate to the state of mind of the wrong-
doer. Occasionally, this would lead to a complete absence of
punishment or to a mere admonition, even for serious damage.
Consequently, the idea developed that civil compensation
ought to be distinguished from guilt and criminal sanction.
Furthermore, while a list of offenses was necessary for the
administration of criminal law, as it seemed unthinkable to
entrust the judge with a discretionary power over the liberty of
citizens, civil liability, when detached from criminal liability,
could be built on a more general principle. The basis of that
principle was that one suffering damage from another as a
result of faulty behavior should be entitled to obtain compensa-
tion from the wrongdoer.
The fault principle thus came to be conceived and ex-
pressed by the jurists of the natural law school, in particular
by Domat and Grotius.10 Domat wrote in 1689:
All losses and damage which may occur by the act of any
person, whether by imprudence, carelessness, ignorance of
what should have been known, or other similar faults,
slight as they may be, must be repaired by him whose
imprudence or other fault has caused them. For it is a tort
that he has done, even though he had no intention to
harm. Thus, anyone who imprudently plays ball in a place
where there could be danger for the passer-by and in fact
injures someone is liable for the harm he causes."
Precisely one century before the French revolution, a revolution
had been achieved in the legal conception of civil liability; from
a history of specific wrongs, the principle emerged that every-
one should be protected against any type of wrong conduct and
against all types of loss.
This is the principle which was adopted as self-evident by
the drafters of the French Civil Code. 2 To appreciate the bold-
ness of the principle, one may remark that, at the end of the
nineteenth century, the drafters of the German Civil Code did
10. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 590-96; K. ZWEIGERT &
H. Kdrz, supra note 3, at 283-84.
11. 2 J. DOMAT, LES LOIS CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL tit. 8, n* 4 (1689).
12. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 594-98.
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not dare to adopt it. Instead, they preferred to state three prin-
ciples applicable to various wrongs and supplement them by
more specific provisions. Additionally, they made unlawfulness
a concept independent from that of fault and the latter a condi-
tion of civil liability.' 3 It was a sophisticated and narrow ap-
proach, with little justification as far as the Frenchman can
see," and one which has been modernized without losing its
complexity. 5
No less remarkable is the fact that the common law has
never formulated a general principle of civil liability. A few
decades ago, one could foresee the time when the tort of negli-
gence would absorb all others. Today, however, the evolution
appears unthinkable. Progress in legal thinking has shown that
many aspects of civil liability need to be governed by principles
other than negligence or fault. It thus appears very unlikely,
notwithstanding recent advances of a liability based on negli-
gence, 8 that a single principle will ever be formulated, even in
the restricted field where it is still valid.
Can it be said, in defense of the present situation of the
common law, that no general principle unifying the law of civil
liability is acceptable, even within a limited field? One may
doubt the validity of the defense. First, one must admit that
systems such as Louisiana, Quebec, France, and a number of
others, having operated for centuries under what is basically a
regime of liability based on fault, have remained satisfied with
it provided it is kept in its proper field and restricted so as to
allow room for other ideas.
Second, the extension of the tort of negligence may be
regarded as an implicit recognition of the validity of liability
for fault, even if the remaining technicalities of the law of negli-
13. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, supra note 3, at 266-73.
14. See COLLOQUE FRANCO-GERMANO-SUISSE SUR LES FONDEMENTS ET LES FONCTIONS
DE LA RESPONSABIUT9 CIVLE (F. Klein ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as COLLOQUE].
15. See COLLOQUE, supra note 14; K. ZWEIGERT & H. Korz, supra note 3, at 266-
73.
16. See, e.g., Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge Willemstad, 11
A.L.R. 227 (1976) (Austl.); Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1977] 2 W.L.R.
1024 (Eng.); Cane, Recovery for Purely Economic Loss in Australia, 93 L.Q. REV. 333
(1977) (Eng.); Stanton, Negligence and Local Authorities, 93 L.Q. REV. 488 (1977);
Thomson, Negligence and Economic Loss, 40 MOD. L. REv. 714 (1977) (Eng.).
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gence reveal a resistance to a complete application of this prin-
ciple. Hepple and Matthews remark:
The really striking and all-important development has
been the emergence of negligence into a distinct tort and
its subsequent octopus-like spread into the waters once
occupied by older torts . . . . The creation of new duty-
situations in the tort of negligence paradoxically reveals
both the flexible, open-ended nature of this tort (e.g. in
regard to the duty to control the conduct of others) and
the difficulties in formulating a general principle of liabil-
ity or non-liability (e.g. in regard to loss to economic inter-
ests). 7
Finally, it is interesting to read works on torts by common
law lawyers and to observe that many of them, at one place or
the other, come very close to the idea of liability for fault. Thus,
Prosser, after explaining through etymology that "a tort is con-
duct which is twisted, or crooked, not straight," continues:
Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breach
of contract [up to this point, a civilian would be satisfied]
for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of
an action for damages. . . .[T]orts consist of the breach
of duties fixed and imposed upon the parties by the law
itself. 8
Simarily, John G. Fleming sees in .the law of torts "merely a
random collection of miscellaneous wrongs which have little or
no relation to each other . . . except for a vague notion that
harm resulting from anti-social behavior should be compen-
sated"11-a remark of great interest to the civilian.
In England, Jolowicz, in the ninth edition of Winfield on
Tort, considered it necessary (after Lord Atkin, to whom he
refers, in Donoghue v. Stevenson") to stress that the fault prin-
ciple should be kept within limits and thus stated:
17. B. HEPPLE & M. MATrHEWS, TORT: CASES AND MATmALS 2 (1974). The same
authors deplore the lack of coherence and unity of the English law of tort. Id. at 1.
18. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 4 (4th ed. 1971).
19. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (4th ed. 1971). See also C. MORRIS, MORRIS
ON TORTS 11-12, 26 & 48 (1953).
20. [19321 A.C. 562, 580 (Eng.).
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In fact the law cannot even go so far as to order every
person whose action may be regarded as morally culpable
to make redress to those who suffer by it: "Acts or omis-
sions which any moral code would censure cannot in a
practical world be treated so as to give a right to every
person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules
of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the
extent of their remedy."'"
Since the time this famous pronouncement was made, how-
ever, the limits to the range of complainants and the extent of
their remedy have consistently been expanded. Furthermore,
one of the most perceptive writers in the law of torts, Tony
Weir, uses language strangely similar to that of one familiar
with the fault principle: "[T~he law of torts determines when
one person must pay another compensation for harm wrong-
fully caused . . . . [I]n tort the plaintiff says that the defen-
dant did something he should not have done.""2 He also states
that "the typical complaint of the plaintiff in tort is: 'You did
something wrong' . . . . [T]he victim can sue the firm if he
establishes the fault of the driver," 3 and again:
In most cases it is not enough to discover simply that the
defendant acted, and thereby caused the damage. His act
must be legally qualified before liability follows. Here the
prevalent test is whether the defendant acted reasonably.
On the whole, if the defendant acted reasonably, he is not
going to have to pay damages. 4
Of course, other developments do emphasize the difference be-
tween the common law of torts and the Louisiana or French law
of civil liability. However, it is striking to see that some basic
statements could have been subscribed by a French jurist. One
can even find in Williams and Hepple the following statement:
"Sooner or later . . . one is driven back to the fault principle
21. P. WINFIELD & J. JOLOWICZ, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 1 (9th ed. 1971),
quoting Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580. Cf. K. ZWEIGERT & H. K6TZ,
supra note 3, at 266 (Jhering's statement).
22. T. WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 1 (3d ed. 1974).
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 6.
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as the foundation of liability in tort."" Equally impressive is
the question of Professor Heuston, the present editor of the
classical Salmond on the Law of Torts:2 "Could we not adopt
the simplicity of French law?" 27
It is striking also to realize that the alternative to the
application of the law of torts is no-fault compensation. The
social value of the fault principle probably provides the basis
for the closeness of the principle to certain exponents of the
common law.
Let us ask ourselves what is the basic function of law in
general, and more particularly of the law of civil liability. It is
a mere platitude to say that law is the tool which permits a
maintenance of the balance between man's freedom and pow-
ers, and his social duties. One may quarrel with the famous
saying of Kant defining law as the means to assure "the coex-
istence of freedoms." Society is not merely a coexistence of free
individuals. It is also built on a solidarity within a community
of citizens. Life in society does not only restrict the otherwise
unlimited freedom that we would enjoy if we were living alone
(assuming man could live alone), it also entitles us to some
form of brotherhood. The aim of law, therefore, is not only to
protect and harmonize our freedoms, but also to permit and
promote the development of our personalities.
This is true of all branches of law: family, contract, prop-
erty, social security and even taxation. But this is especially
true of the law of civil liability. Its main purpose is to harmo-
nize the relations between persons who have no special tie be-
tween them. If I live in an apartment, may I play the piano or
enjoy rock music records? Yes, but to a certain extent only. All
occupants of the building need to make some noise, but they
also need to rest and to sleep. I shall therefore have to place
limits on the fulfillment of my desires. A regulation of the city
or of the management of the building may provide that I should
not make any significant noise after, say, ten o'clock in the
evening. In any event, I have to live, not like Robinson Crusoe
on his island, but as a tenant in a building where fellow citizens
25. G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE, supra note 8, at 115-16.
26. R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS (17th ed. 1977).
27. Id.-at 242.
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live and sleep. More broadly speaking, in all situations I should
behave as a reasonable citizen, aware that he is living in a
society and therefore must adjust himself to his duties as a
member of that society. This harmonization of personalities
can be realized in two ways: (1) by regulation, including crimi-
nal law, and/or (2) by civil liability. Since regulation cannot
cover every aspect of our activity (and since the prospect of a
society where every activity would be submitted to regulation
appears dreadful), civil liability is a very important tool of life
in a society. We then see how justified and valuable it is to
require that every citizen permanently adjust himself to his
duties as a member of a society and incur liability for every
harm caused by departure from this standard. This is precisely
the fault principle.
It is a well-known aphorism that "general propositions do
not decide concrete cases." With respect to its author, Justice
Holmes, the statement is not substantiated by experience. The
judge, of course, is no more a slot machine in a codified system
of law than in a common law system. However, it is our com-
mon experience, as Louisiana and French jurists, that the legal
propositions contained in a code may unquestionably be appli-
cable to some sets of circumstances. In such a situation these
propositions either "decide concrete cases" or at least offer
valuable guidance to citizens, lawyers and, if need be, judges."
This has been true even of the extremely broad proposition
that one shall be liable for the damage caused by his fault. Of
course, the application of this proposition has given rise to
more numerous and basic questions than any other principle
of our Civil Code. A few such questions may be enumerated.
Are all kinds of damage capable of "compensation" and which
rules will govern the assessment of such damages? How can one
be compensated, for instance, for the loss of a spouse, a child,
or an arm? If one's earning capacity is reduced, shall he be
entitled to a lump sum or to periodic payments? Shall we take
into account a mere reduction of his earning capacity or only
an actual reduction of his earnings? What about the loss of a
hope or an increased threat to one's health?
28. See Methodology, supra note 1, at 464.
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Another critical problem which often emerges is that of the
causal connection between the damage complained of and the
fault. Finally, the concept of fault itself is not free from ambi-
guity. Is the definition of fault applicable to an insane person?
To a physically handicapped person? To a mentally handi-
capped person? To a very young boy or girl or to an elderly
person? Should we apply the same rules for judging behavior
to the wrongdoer and to the victim? Should inaction be consid-
ered a fault in certain circumstances and should it be judged
by the same standard as an action? Is there not an excuse in
some circumstances for departing from the ordinary behavior
of a good and reasonable citizen? For instance, is the physician
at fault if, in rushing to answer an emergency call, he disre-
gards the speed limit or takes a chance in passing a car?
These are but a few of the many questions which have
faced the courts in their application of the fault principle. One
may readily admit that some of these questions would be better
answered by the legislature, or that a modem codification
should give more guidance to the judge than does the French
Civil Code. Still, one may feel that the fault principle consti-
tutes an excellent approach to the general problem of civil
liability-excellent not only from a philosophical point of view,
but also because it gives many problems of civil liability their
proper foundation and background. The speaker confesses that
he considers the approach of the French Civil Code to civil
liability greatly superior to the complicated approach of the
German Civil Code or to the fragmented approach of the com-
mon law."
29. The speaker is reluctant to engage in a demonstration of this point because
he had, in 1975, already tried to present this demonstration at a Colloquium organized
in Canberra on Problems of Codification by Professor S.J. Stoljar, and he does not
want to repeat himself. He has opposed the simplicity of the fault principle to the
complexities of the rules of common law or of the German Civil Code in this field. He
has tried to show by examples that the fault principle was a valuable regulator of
activities and behaviors, not only for the man in his apartment, as evidenced before,
but for the writer, the businessman or the corporation, for example, in their competi-
tion with others, in their relations with the customers or in their dealings with retailers.
See Codification, supra note 1. As regards invasions of the right of personality, see K.
ZWEIGERT & H. K6Tz, supra note 3, at 347-51; R. LINDON, LA CRATION PRTORIENNE
EN MATII RE DE DROITS DE LA PERSONALIT] (1974).
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Obviously, the task of the judge in the application of the
fault principle is not always an easy one. He often has to har-
monize conflicting social values as best he can. It is true also
that, in some cases, an unqualified application of the fault
principle may lead to excessive liability, 0 and thus it might be
wise to give to the judge an equitable power of mitigation of the
damage.3' Nevertheless, the fault principle places civil liability
on a general, but reasonably firm, basis which does not exist
when the principle is not accepted.
It is not enough to assess only the merits of the fault princi-
ple inscribed in articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code.
As earlier recalled, the Code contains three other articles per-
taining to civil liability, which will be briefly considered here.
Article 1384 contains the rule governing vicarious liabili-
ties. The father (or now the father and the mother jointly) are
liable for the damage occasioned by their minor children resid-
ing with them. However, they are discharged of any liability if
they can prove that "they have been unable to prevent the fact
which gave rise to the liability"-a rule which can also be
found in the last paragraph of article 2320 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. 2 These provisions have given rise only to a limited
and acceptable amount of litigation.13 However, the second of
these rules, inspired by the logic .of the fault principle, has
30. One thinks mainly of the problem of economic losses which may result from
an inadvertence and which seems more properly covered by one-party insurance. See
K. ZWEIGERT & H. Korz, supra note 3, at 292-93. On the latest developments on this
question, see Buxton, Built Upon Sand, 41 MOD. L. REv. 85 (1978); Cane, supra note
16; Thomson, supra note 16.
If French law appears unsatisfactory on this problem, the same may be said of the
English common law. More generally, the development of one-party insurance is one
of the factors which would justify granting to the judge an equitable power of mitiga-
tion of the damage.
31. See Tunc, Les probikmes contemporains de la responsabilitk civil, 19 REV.
INT'L DR. COMP. 757, 776-77 (1967) [REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARIj (Fr.).
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2320 provides in part: "In the above cases, responsibility
only attaches, when the masters or employers, teachers and artisans, might have
prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it."
33. 6 C. AUBREY ET' C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS nos 418-21 (7th ed. 1975); P. LE
TOURNEAU, LA RESPONSAfiLrr CIVILE n' s 1637-67 (2d ed. 1976); 1 H. MAZEAUD, L.
MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC, TRAIT9 THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILrIT CIVILE
D9LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE n' s 732-83 (6th ed. 1965).
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proved barely manageable. 4 Construed as it has been by the
courts, it would oblige the father and the mother to prove that
they have been good educators-a burden of proof which is not
easily met. On the other hand, assuming they have given suffi-
cient evidence of their qualities as educators, the rule would
discharge them whenever the damage occurred by accident or
while they were away at work-a rule which would often leave
the victim without protection. The doctrine of Louisiana on
this point is certainly preferable.35
Two remarks, in the speaker's opinion, can be made in
regard to article 1384. The first is that the fault principle is a
valuable foundation of civil liability, but should not be allowed
to control it alone. If codal liability of the parents for the mis-
deeds of the children is established, it may be a wise policy to
go further than did the drafters of the Civil Code and to make
it a strict one. This would have the result of giving a better
protection to the victims of children's misdeeds, of giving
greater incentive to the parents to control their children, and
of avoiding litigation on problems which in fact escape evi-
dence. Additionally, the present availability of liability insur-
ance would protect the parents against excessive hardship. The
second observation is that the case law which developed for the
application of these rules could and should have been clearer
if the work of our supreme court, the Cour de cassation, was
performed in a more efficient manner. This is a very important
point to which it will be necessary to return in the second part
of this lecture.
Article 1384 also contains comparable rules on the liability
of teachers and artisans for the damage caused by their schol-
ars and apprentices. However, liability of artisans has never
created any problem, 31 and the presumption of liability bearing
upon teachers was abolished by a 1973 statute7.3
34. See Carbonnier, Foreward to P. OLLIER, LA RESPONSABILMrI CIVILE DES PERES
ET MRES (1961).
35. E.g., Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975). See F. STONE, supra note
4, at § 83.
36. C. AUuaY Er C. RAu, supra note 33, at nos 422-23;'P. LE TOURNEAU, supra
note 33, at nos 1668-74; H. MAZFAUD, L. MAzEuD rr A. TuNc, supra note 33, at nos
852-56.
37. C. AuBRY wr C. RAu, supra note 33, at nos 417, 436; P. LE TouRNEAu, supra
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Finally, the most important segment of the vicarious lia-
bilities is the liability of masters and employers for the damage
occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of
the functions in which they are employed. This liability is ex-
pressed in similar terms by article 1384 of the French Civil
Code and by article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code. However,
the former, in contrast with the latter, does not provide that
"responsibility only attaches, when the master or employers
• . . might have prevented the act which caused the damage,
and have not done it." In the speaker's view, for reasons which
cannot be elaborated here, the French regime is the better of
the two. It has been applied by the courts without any special
difficulty" except with respect to one point: the qualification
"in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed"
has given rise to great uncertainty. The Cour de cassation has
recently passed upon the matter,39 but one may doubt whether
the decision will clarify the confusion. The problem is a diffi-
cult one and has created perplexities in all jurisdictions. 9
Thus, subject to some qualification, a French jurist will
normally feel that the codification of the law of civil liability
in his country has been very valuable. This, however, is only a
temporary conclusion. Experience has revealed some weak-
nesses of this codification, which will be set forth in the second
part of this lecture.
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FRENCH CODIFICATION
The fault principle may be thought of as a great social
regulator; it is valuable to govern activities of all kinds. It is
capable of governing both the lives of tenants in a collective
building and the conduct of large corporations engaged in fierce
note 33, at n's 1676-91; H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC, supra note 33, at n0 s
784-835.
38. See C. AuBRY Er C. RAu, supra note 33, at n°S 424-28; P. LE TOURNEAU, supra
note 33, at n"S 1692-778; H. MAZEA D, L. MAZEAUD Er A. TUNC, supra note 33, at n' s
857-949; K. ZWEIGERT & H. KdTz, supra note 3, at 300-03.
39. Judgment of 10 juin 1977, Cass. ass. plen., D.1977.1.465 note Larroumet;
J.C.P.1977.2.18730 conclusions Gulphe. See also Durry, Responsabilitk civile, 75 REV.
TRIM. DR. CIV. 768, 772 (1977) [REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL] (Fr.).
40. As regards Louisiana, see F. STONE, supra note 4, at § 91.
1064 [Vol. 39
FRENCH TORT LAW
competition with each other. Yet, at our stage of civilization,
the fault principle is often too vague, and more precision must
be added to the law by regulations of all natures. This is the
first weakness of the French codification.
An obvious example is the need for traffic regulations. It
is not enough to state that every automobile driver should drive
carefully. For example, the law must tell him whether he
should drive on the right or on the left side of the road, whether
he shall have the right of way at an intersection if another car
is coming. However, the law goes even further. It does not only
harmonize the traffic. It makes driving safer by requiring any
prospective driver to obtain a license after examination and by
specifying the equipment of vehicles and providing for their
inspection. The development of regulation in this field is too
obvious to require elaboration.
What should be briefly underlined, however, is that the
same explosion of regulation has occurred in nearly all fields of
activity.4' Fairness in competition is still governed by the fault
principle, but also by many strict and detailed rules. A corpo-
ration must deal fairly with the public when it offers securities,
calls for a general meeting of its shareholders, or issues some
statements. But such fairness is now heavily regulated and
controlled. Again, the phenomenon is too obvious to require
further development.
The main weakness of the French codification in the field
of civil liability, however, probably lies in the inability it has
shown to cope effectively with the problem of accidents." Pos-
sibly the French judge might have made better use of the codal
provisions, at least in the last few decades. Thus, the criticism
41. See THE BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHII(Jacoby ed. 1975); M. WEIDEN-
BAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC (1977).
42. See Tunc, Limitation on Codification-A Separate Law of Traffic Accidents,
44 TUL. L. REV. 757 (1970). See also Tunc, Analysis of the French Auto Accident
Compensation System, in DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 1 (1970).
The sch lars who, in the last decades, have underlined the need for a fresh ap-
proach to the problem of accidents are so numerous as to defy citation. Perhaps,
however, a special tribute should be paid to Harper and James who, more than twenty
years ago, devoted the entire part two of their treatise (nearly 1,000 pages) to acci-
dents. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 729-1675 (1956).
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should be addressed, not to codification as such, but to codifi-
cation in this field as it has been utilized by the French courts.
There is probably great truth in the suggestion. However, acci-
dents generally require specific legislation.
Through the centuries the advance of the law of civil liabil-
ity brought it closer to the idea of liability for fault. In the
process, the problem of accidents was more and more left aside.
The philosophy of civil liability is that man is free; that he has
to choose between good and evil, between right and wrong; and
that, should he make the wrong choice, his victim should re-
ceive compensation. This is a somewhat simplistic, but still
sound, philosophy. However, it is justified only as regards de-
liberate decisions made by an individual. It should not govern
the realm of accidents. An accident is an unfortunate event,
which may occur purely by mishap, which probably is the
result of some human failure, but which, even in that case,
occurs against the will of its author. Thus, the classical fault
philosophy has little application to it. Furthermore, in most
cases, the human failure which caused the accident is not as
much a "fault," as it is an error that reasonable persons might
commit. 3 It is obvious that no one can play tennis or football
without often missing the ball. If is therefore absurd to im-
ply that the boy who has missed the ball while playing with a
friend has committed a fault." Research has shown that even
a good driver will commit errors which, in an unfortunate set
of circumstances, may produce an accident. It is therefore no
less absurd to consider at fault the driver who has committed
an error of this kind. An error is a behavior which is theoreti-
cally regrettable, but statistically unavoidable. Finally, quite
often the author of an error injures himself, his spouse, or
someone in his family. It is clear, therefore, that a mere appli-
43. See Tunc, Fault: A Common Name For Different Misdeeds, 49 Tui.. L. REV.
279 (1975).
44. This is however what has been held by the French Cour de cassation in
Judgment of 1 er dec. 1965, Cass. civ., J.C.P.1966.2.14567. See Tunc, Tort Law and
the Moral Law [1972 A] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 247.
Some subsequent decisions follow this path, while others take a different view of
the problem. See Tunc, Enigmatique maladresse, in FEsTsCHRIrr FOR ERNST VON
CAEMMERER 1117 (1978).
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cation of the fault principle in the field of accidents would be
morally unjustified, logically unsound, and socially pointless.
Accidents have always occurred. it was probably as a re-
sponse to the problem of accidents that special rules came to
life under Roman law that can still be found in our codes today.
These rules dealt with those forms of accidental damage which
were the most common at that' time: damage caused by an
animal or by the fall of a building. It was only with industriali-
zation, however, that accidents multiplied and became a social
problem.
During the greater part of the nineteenth century, the
French courts merely applied the law of civil liability to the
problem of accidents. The victims of work accidents only re-
ceived compensation if they could give evidence of a fault of the
employer. 5 Most of the time, however, the accident was the
result of their own "fault," that is, a split-second lapse of
attention during a ten-hour work day. As a consequence, the
victims and their families were left in distress.
The solution was criticized by a number of writers who, by
various well-known arguments, asked for a reform of the law."
It is remarkable that the Cour de cassation was willing to follow
their views as early as 1896, in the famous Guissez, Cousin et
Oriolle v. Teffaine cause.' An explosion had occurred aboard
a steam tug and a member of the crew had been fatally injured.
The lower courts found that the explosion was probably the
result of a defect in the boiler. The court of appeal then rea-
soned that there was in the contract of labor an implied obliga-
tion to compensate the victim against the damage suffered as
a consequence of an explosion and that, furthermore, the ex-
plosion of the tug could be considered as the fall of a building.
Therefore, the owners of the tug were liable to the victim's
family. The Cour de cassation did not approve the reasoning,
but it maintained the solution. In a few words, it held that the
explosion was not a case of vis major and that, therefore, under
45. Judgment of 19 juill. 1870, Cass. civ., D.1870.1.361, S. 1871.1.9 note Labb6.
See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 598-600.
46. See A. VoN MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 600-05.
47. Judgment of 16 juin 1896, Cass. civ., D.1897.1.433 note Saleilles, S.1897.1.17
note Esmein. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 608-10.
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article 1384 of the Civil Code, the owners of the tug were liable.
This was a revolution. The Court had followed the lead of var-
ious text-writers and given an autonomous meaning to the
meaningless words of article 1384, identical to the first sentence
of article 2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code: "We are responsible
• . . for the damage. . . caused by the act. . . of the things
which we have in our custody."48
The new doctrine became useless almost immediately. A
statute was passed in 1898 giving workers an automatic right
to some compensation in case of industrial accidents." This
was probably the reason why the Cour de cassation did not
immediately expand its new theory. On the contrary, in 1897,
when the bill which became the 1898 Act was already before
the Parlement, the Court refused to apply the new doctrine in
a case of explosion where the cause of the accident was totally
unknown and no defect of the boiler had been found. 0 In fact,
the new theory did not reappear until 1919. Again, the ma-
chine, a locomotive in this case, had been well built and pro-
perly maintained, and had successfully passed the tests pro-
vided by regulations. However, the owner was held liable to
those injured following an explosion of the machine.'
After World War I, the problem of accidents became
mainly the problem of traffic accidents. It was soon agreed that
an autonomous meaning should be given to the last words of
article 1384 and that a distinct liability for damage caused by
things should be established. However, there was great hesita-
tion in determining the proper scope of this new liability.
Should it apply to all kinds of things or only to dangerous
things? Should it even apply to an automobile, since most
traffic accidents occur, not by the fact of the vehicle itself, but
as a result of human failures? Those questions received differ-
ent answers in Belgium and in France. In Belgium, the Cour
de cassation decided that automatic liability would attach to
48. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2317.
49. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 611-12.
50. Judgment of 30 mars 1897, Cass. req., D.1897.1.433 note Saleilles;
S.1898.1.65 note Esmein. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3 at 617-18.
51. Judgment of 21 jan. 1919, Cass. civ., D.1922.1.25 note Ripert, S.1922.1.265.
See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 618-20.
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the "keeper" (gardien) of a thing only if evidence was 'given
that the damage was caused by a vice of the thing. 2 This is the
doctrine which was espoused by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Loescher v. Parr" and which seems the wisest, at least in
certain respects.54 In France, Jand'heur v. Les Galeries
Belfortaises," a very famous case decided in 1930 by the Cour
de cassation in full chambers, stated that the keeper of a thing,
whatever the thing, was under a "presumption of liability"
which could be discharged only by evidence of the fault of the
injured party or of a third person or of the occurrence of vis
major.50
The basic principle laid down in the Jand'heur case still
remains valid.57 It has given rise, however, to a number of varia-
tions. What had been a "presumption of fault" before the
Jand'heur case and had become with this case a "presumption
of liability" became for some years "prima facie liability"
(responsabilit6 de plein droit) before fading away and taking
the colorless name of "the liability of article 1384, para. I.""
There has also been great hesitation to identify the "keeper."
For the purpose of this lecture, suffice it to say that it is usually
52. R. DALCQ, supra note 4, at §§ 2012, 2137-61.
53. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
54. See F. STONE, supra note 4, at §§ 61, 310; Tunc, Louisiana Tort Law at the
Crossroads, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1111 (1974). In effect, the solutions adopted in Louisiana
and Belgium seem similar. There is, however, some difference in their theoretical
presentation. In Belgium, strict liability for a defective object is considered as such,
without reference to the idea of fault. In Louisiana, Justices Tate and Barham, who
have been the main architects of the new construction (Justice Barham having left the
supreme court at the time of the Loescher decision), speak in terms of a "legal fault":
the failure of a person "to prevent the person or thing for whom he is responsible from
causing" an "unreasonable risk of injury to others." 324 So. 2d at 441, 446. Liability
for damage caused by the vice of a thing under article 2317 is thus integrated in a
generai doctrine which covers both liability based on articles 2315 and 2316, and the
other strict liabilities, including vicarious liabilities, which are found in article 2318-
22. See 2 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD, E' J. MAZEAUD, TRAITt THiORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
LA RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILE nos 1312-28 (6th ed. 1970) (theory of fsute dans la garde).
55. Judgment of 13 fevr. 1930, Cass. ch. reun., D.1930.1.57 note Ripert,
S.1930.1.121 note Esmein.
56. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 622-31.
57. See generally K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, supra note 3, at 322-29.
58. See Bach, Reflexions sur le probl~me du fondement de la responsabilitO civile
en droit francais, 75 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 17 (1977).
1979] 1069
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the owner." There has been even greater confusion as to which
events may discharge the keeper of the liability bearing upon
him."0 The present situation is the following: (a) the keeper is
discharged of this liability if he can prove that an event exter-
nal to himself and to the thing, which was unforeseeable or
normally unforeseeable, has made the accident unavoidable;
this event can be a natural event, such as ice, fog, storm, or the
fault or "fact" (fait) of the injured party or a third party; (b)
the keeper's liability is reduced if the keeper can prove that a
fault or "fact" of the injured party (and not a natural event or
third party's fault or "fact") has concurred in the production
of the damage; liabilities are then assessed on the basis of the
comparative causations; the Cour de cassation makes it clear
that the "fact" of the victim needs not be a fault to produce
that effect; we must assume, however, that the "fact" needs
to be an abnormal one: someone lying on the pavement and
run over by a car is not entitled to compensation, even though
he was on the pavement because he had been stricken by a
disease or had been knocked down by some robber, but a pe-
destrian on the sidewalk is certainly entitled to compensation
if a car comes and hits him. Thus, the law developed on the
basis of article 1384 rests on two foundations: (a) a rule of evi-
dence: a presumption of fault or, more precisely, a presumption
of causation, which can be rebutted by evidence that the dam-
age was caused by a "(normally) unforeseeable and irresis-
tible" external event; and (b) a rule of substance: an absolute
liability for the damage resulting from a defect of the thing or
a failure (even health failure) of one of the parties (the failure
of the injured party discharging, of course, the keeper)."
The courts were, for a while, very proud of the ability of
their construction of article 1384, para. I, to respond to the
59. C. AUBRY gr C. RAU, supra note 33, at n°8 450-54; P. LETouRNEAU, supra note
33, at no8 1812-39; H. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ET L. MAZEAUD, supra note 54, at Nos 1155-
89; A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 667-78; K. ZWEIGERT & H. K&Tz,
supra note 3, at 325-26; Tunc, supra note 54, at 1119.
* 60. C. AUBREY ET C. RAU, supra note 33, at nos 456-61; P. LE TOURNEAU, supra
note 33, at nos 1840-41; H. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ur L. MAzEA , supra note 54, at
nos 1429-1665; A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 645-67.
61. See Tunc, supra note 54, at 1118-19; Tune, The Twentieth Century Develop-
ment and Function of the Law of Torts in France, 14 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 1089 (1965).
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plight of traffic accident victims. Presently, however, there is
widespread dissatisfaction 6 with this solution for two main rea-
sons.
First, the law itself is uncertain. Although the basic princi-
ple is nearly fifty years old, there has been a wavering in its
formulation and in the qualifications it should receive. As a
result of this wavering and of the difficulty of establishing the
facts, the rights of the injured party are very uncertain in most
cases. Consequently, the injured party either has to accept the
settlement offered by an insurer, or go to the courts and wait
for the outcome of the litigation. But the volume of litigation,
in turn, contributes to the uncertainty of the law. Every year,
hundreds of cases of traffic accidents reach the Cour de
cassation and are settled by it. When so many decisions are
made by the Supreme Court of a nation, they no longer clarify
the law, but, to borrow a well-known expression, they add
smoke to the fog.
Furthermore, the present law is basically unsound-to the
point of being paradoxical. 3 Automobile liability insurance
was made compulsory by a 1958 statute. Drivers, therefore, are
no longer liable for the damage they cause to others. Instead
they pay annual premiums to transfer to an insurer the risks
they cause while driving and even the consequences of the most
serious negligent acts they may commit while driving. All of
the severity of the law of civil liability is now concentrated on
the victim. The courts do not even distinguish between fault
and mere error, since the injured party is accountable for the
slightest failure, even if it be statistically unavoidable. The
law, therefore, does not deter us from killing or injuring others
in traffic accidents, but only from being killed or in-
jured-which is hardly necessary. The system works against
ethics, accident prevention, and common sense. As already
mentioned, the injured party is even left without compensation
for a mere "fact," or when he is victim to a sudden formation
of ice on the road, causing a car to slide and hurt him.64 This
62. See Tunc, supra note 54.
63. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 636-39.
64. Judgment of 15 ddc. 1976, Cass. civ., J.C.P.1977.4.34.
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basic defect, however, is not special to French law. The com-
mon law is just as problematic, but French law has been incap-
able of developing the elements which would have eliminated
it.
There is good reason to argue that the present failure of
French law to deal adequately with the traffic accident prob-
lem is largely attributable to the working methods of the Cour
de cassation more than to codification as such. The work of the
Cour de cassation presents two unfortunate features. First,
there is no mechanism for selection of the cases it will decide,
with the result that the six chambers together decide eleven
thousand cases per year. Currently that is twenty cases in an
afternoon for the chamber which deals with civil liability. Sec-
ond, the Cour de cassation deliberately makes its decisions as
barely reasoned as possible, often to the point of being cryptic. 5
Those two features seem extremely regrettable and have been
criticized by various writers, including one of the highest
judges of the country, the Procureur General pros la Cour de
cassation.65 A new attack, based on a comparative study, has
recently been published. 7 However, even though it is launched
in cooperation with the Premier President Pierre Bellet, the
head of the Cour de cassation, it will be difficult to change
deep-rooted habits.
If the Cour de cassation were not working under such terri-
ble time pressure, and if it could devote proper consideration
to traffic accident compensation, it could bring great improve-
ment to the law. The decision made in 1930 in the Jand'heur
case was a remarkable one, both on account of its boldness and
the balance it established between the interests of motorists
and automobile victims. The new developments which have
resulted during nearly a half-century-compulsory insurance,
progress and refinement in legal thinking and particularly ac-
65. For an amusing, severe, but justified presentation of the French practice, see
K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, THE FRAMEWORK 114-15, in 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARA-
TIVE LAW (T. Weir trans. 1977).
66. Touffait et Tunc, Pour une motivation plus explicite des dfcisions de justice,
notamrnment de celles de la Cour de cassation, 72 REV. TRIM. DR. civ. 487 (1974).
67. Tunc, La cour judiciaire supreme: Une enquire comparative, 1978 REV. INT'L
DR. COMP. 1.
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knowledgment of the necessary distinction between fault and
error, publication of the results of numerous research projects
on the unavoidability of errors, and rising expectations toward
security-would call for a new assessment of the desirable rules
of law. The Cour de cassation, which was bold enough to make
the Jand'heur decision, would require much less courage and
imagination to curtail the defenses presently available to the
driver-or rather the driver's insurer-and to create a nearly
absolute liability. This liability would recede only upon evi-
dence of an unexcusable fault on the part of the injured party.5
Thus, a new law of traffic accident victim compensation
lies in the power of the Cour de casstion, nearly at the tips of
its fingers. This law would be free of the irrationalities which
beset the present one and would insure compensation to a great
number of victims who need and deserve such compensation
but are presently deprived of it. In order to avoid an increase
in insurance premium rates, the Cour de cassation could elimi-
nate or greatly reduce damages for non-economic losses. That
solution also lies within its power. However, two limits on the
power of the court do exist. In creating a new law in the frame
of civil liability, even coupled with insurance, the court cannot
assure compensation to the driver whose car collides not with
another car, but with a fixed obstacle. Furthermore, the court
cannot eliminate the present adve'rsary process of indemnifica-
tion to replace it by a system under which victims should as
much as possible claim compensation from their own insur-
ers-a system of first party insurance which seems to have
greatly improved, where it is in operation, the functioning of
insurance."
68. Tunc, Les causes d'exonration de la responsabilitk de plein droit de I'article
1384, atinka Ier, du Code civil, D.1975.Chron.83; Tunc, Les paradoxes du regime
actuel de la responsabilit de plein droit, D.1976.Chron.13; Tunc, Le droit en miettes,
in 22 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 31 (1977).
69. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 636-39; Tunc, Traffic
Accident Compensation in France: The Present Law and a Controversial Proposal, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1966); Tunc, Traffic Accident Compensation: Law and Proposals,
in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 14 (1971).
The courts are, a fortiori, powerless to introduce systems of compensation compa-
rable to the one which now exists in New Zealand. See Palmer, Accident Compensation
in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 Am. J. COMP. L. 1 (1977). Vennell,
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A few observations may conclude this lecture. First, one
should be warned that the creation and development of a liabil-
ity for damage caused by things in France is not in the least
typical of the operation of the law in a codified system of juris-
prudence. The responsibilities of the courts in the application
and construction of the codal provisions have usually been
much narrower than in the field of law presently considered. As
foreseen by Portalis, a few problems emerged in the application
of provisions and the courts solved them. However, nowhere
else than in the field of civil liability had they to build a new
law, entirely new and practically without any foundation.70
Secondly, the judgment that one may pass on the work of
the courts in the field of civil liability is a qualified one. The
Jand'heur case was an admirable decision; it showed the work
of a codified system of law at its best, facing a formidable
challenge. The decision was the result of collective research
and discussion where courts of first instance, courts of appeal,
the Cour de cassation, and doctrinal writers all played the roles
which were expected of them. The decision was creative and
well balanced.
Unfortunately, the law in this field presently seems to have
lost its momentum and to be, as is said of American law in an-
other field, "wandering aimlessly on treacherous moors."7I One
may feel, however, that this is due not to the inability of a
codified law system to deal adequately with new problems or
old problems in a new environment; within certain limits,
which have been enunciated, the law could be adjusted to the
present needs. It is submitted, rather, that if the needed ad-
L'indemnisation des dommages corporels par l'Etat: les resultats d'une experience
d'indemnisation automatique en Nouvelle-Z6lande, 1976 REV. INT'L DR. COMP. 73.
The same is true as regards proposals such as those-made by O'Connell. See O'Con-
nell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for
Many Kinds of Injury, 60 U. MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'Connell, Transferring
Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New "Sole Remedy" Approaches
to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 749.
70. See THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD (B. Schwartz ed.
1956); R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY (Kindred
trans. 1972); Methodology, supra note 1.
71. H. Kook &'Co., Inc. v. Schneinman, Hochstin and Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d 93,
98 (2d Cir. 1969).
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justment has not taken place, it is mainly because the Cour de
cassation, flooded by an ever-increasing flux of cases, did not
dare to make a selection among them and consider only the
cases where it could have modernized and clarified the law. It
is also because the Cour de cassation prides itself in rendering
anonymous decisions as short as possible and deprived of the
necessary explanations. If this is true, one may venture to think
that French jurists, who seem to master statutory law reasona-
bly well,7" have much to learn from the common law tradition
as regards the development of judge-made law. Thus, it ap-
pears that jurisdictions such as Louisiana and Quebec, where
the civil law tradition benefits from the common law approach
to judicial developments, can make an invaluable contribution
both to the civil law and to the common law worlds.73
72. See W. DALE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: A NEW APPROACH 313 (1977).
73. See generally THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND
IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS (J. Dainow ed. 1974).
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